Memory means ensuring the immutability of truth over time. In the physical world, we use archives to preserve our stories. In the digital world, we use cryptography to protect identity, authorship, and trust.
A new threat from quantum computers now challenges this foundation. At scale, it will be able to erase or forge the cryptographic records that shape our digital lives.
To protect the integrity of collective memory and prevent future attackers from stealing identities, I have left previous cryptographic standards behind and implemented the highest security level available today, post-quantum technology. The double threat: Shor and Grover
Quantum computing poses two distinct mathematical threats to modern cryptography. To understand the transition to post-quantum standards, it is essential to know both.
Shor's Algorithm: The Public-Key Breaker
Shor's algorithm represents the existential threat. It efficiently solves the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems that underpin nearly all classical public-key cryptography, including RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curve systems (ECC). This is not a degradation but a complete break. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer can derive a private key from a public key, thereby fundamentally undermining classical identity systems.
Grover's Algorithm: The Symmetric Squeezer
Grover's algorithm targets symmetric cryptography and hash functions. It provides a quadratic speedup for brute-force searches, effectively halving the security strength of a key. This is why AES-256 is so crucial: even after Grover's reduction, it still offers 128 bits of effective security, which is computationally practically unbreakable.
The practical consequence: Store now, decrypt later
The most immediate danger is the SNDL attack (Store Now, Decrypt Later). Encrypted traffic, identity proofs, certificates, and signatures can be intercepted today, while classical cryptography is still valid, and stored indefinitely. Once quantum technology matures, these archives can be decrypted or forged retroactively. If our cryptographic foundations fail, we also lose the ability to document our own digital history.
Beyond outdated standards: Why ML-DSA-87
For years, elliptic curve cryptography, particularly P-384 (ECDSA), was the gold standard in high-security environments. While P-384 offers about 192 bits of classical security, it has no resistance whatsoever to Shor's algorithm. It was designed for a classical world, and that world is coming to an end.
This is why I have implemented ML-DSA-87 for Root CA and signing operations. ML-DSA-87 is the highest security level defined by modern lattice-based standards, offering Category 5 security, which is computationally equivalent to AES-256. Choosing this level instead of the more common ML-DSA-65 ensures that my network's identity is built with the greatest possible security margin available today.
Hardware reality: AArch64 and the PQC load
Post-quantum cryptography is no longer theoretical. It is deployable now, even on routers and mobile-class hardware. I am running a custom OpenSSL 3.5.0 build on an AArch64 MediaTek Filogic 830/880 platform. This SoC is unusually well-suited for post-quantum workloads.
Vector scaling with NEON
ML-KEM and ML-DSA rely heavily on polynomial arithmetic. ARM NEON vector instructions allow these operations to be executed in parallel, significantly reducing TLS handshake latency even with large PQ key material.
Memory efficiency
Post-quantum keys are large. A public ML-KEM-1024 key is 1568 bytes, compared to 49 bytes for P-384. The 64-bit address space of AArch64 allows for clean management of these buffers, avoiding fragmentation and pressure issues seen on older architectures.
Technical verification: Post-quantum CLI checks
After installing the custom toolchain on the AArch64 target system, the post-quantum stack can be verified directly.
KEM verification
openssl list -kem-algorithms
Expected output:
ml-kem-1024
secp384r1mlkem1024 (high-security hybrid)
Signature verification
openssl list -signature-algorithms | grep -i ml
Expected output:
ml-dsa-87 (256-bit security)
The presence of these algorithms confirms that the platform supports both post-quantum key exchange (ML-KEM-1024) and quantum-resistant signatures (ML-DSA-87).
Summary: My AArch64 post-quantum stack
- Library: OpenSSL 3.5.4 (custom AArch64 build)
- SoC: MediaTek Filogic 830 / 880
- Architecture: ARMv8-A (AArch64)
- Key exchange: ML-KEM-1024 + hybrids
- Identity & signature: ML-DSA-87
- Security level: Level 5 (quantum-ready)
- Status: Production-ready
By moving directly to ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87, I have bypassed the outdated bottlenecks of the last decade. My network is no longer preparing for the quantum transition; it has already completed it. The rest of the industry will follow suit in time.
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